Rafah operation won’t help Israel escape its political doom loop 

Until elections would be held and the Israeli leadership would change, expanding the Israeli military operation to Rafah would not bring a different outcome from the Israeli offensive so far.

As the ongoing attempts to revive a ceasefire and hostage deal between Israel and Hamas are showing minimal signs of success, Israel is moving forward with its plan for an operation in Rafah, the most southern city in Gaza that borders Egypt. On May 6, the Israeli military issued an evacuation order for more than 200,000 Gazans in the southern-west part of the Gaza Strip. 

Most Gazans now fleeing Rafah are being displaced for the second or third time in the past seven months of the war, after more than a million Gazans fled there during the war. Soonafter, the Israeli army took hold of the Raffah crossing. The Israeli government has referred to an operation in Rafah as necessary to achieve its war objectives, which include eliminating Hamas's governmental and military capabilities and releasing the hostages held by Hamas.  

However, the current government of Benjamin Netanyahu is incapable of achieving such objectives, with or without Rafah. Even if the Israeli military manages to conquer Rafah, it does not solve the real reason why the Israeli government fails to meet its objectives: the political doom loop regarding the question of how to govern Gaza.  

The different proposals for governing Gaza in the day after Hamas could be classified to two main categories. The first, advocated mainly by the Israeli right wing, is the West-Bankanization of Gaza. That is, an Israeli military regime would lead the governance of Gaza and dissect it to different areas with limitations on Palestinian freedom of movement between them. Further down the road, some of the proponents of such proposals push for reestablishing Jewish settlements in Gaza. The other category is a Palestinian-led government that is somewhat based upon the Palestinian Authority, its allies, and a regional coalition to support the reconstruction of Gaza. Many proponents of this strategy, especially the Biden administration, believe it could be part of a broader normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel.  

However, for the Netanyahu government, both categories are considered politically impossible. Netanyahu is deeply dependent on the settler right wing to maintain his rule. His ongoing corruption trial made him a political pariah in Israeli politics, leaving only the ultra-orthodox parties and the settler right wing as viable political partners. Because of the right wing's strong opposition to any independent Palestinian self-governance, particularly one with a connection to the Palestinian Authority or any hint of a pathway to a Palestinian statehood, Netanyahu has no wiggle room to pursue such a solution. According to the messianic vision of politicians like Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich and Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir, no strategic benefit of normalization with Saudi Arabia could justify concessions to the Palestinians. 

Conversely, the U.S., the international community, and some of the more moderate ministers in the government are firmly against institutionalizing an official military regime in Gaza. Theoretically, international law allows a country to establish a temporary military regime as part of a transition period, ensuing a conflict that ensures stability for the local population. Yet, in light of the nature of Israeli occupation since the 1967 War, which is anything but temporary and includes many violations of international law and the expansionist settler vision of many politicians in Israel, a military regime would be a red line for the international community.  

While there is no majority in the Israeli government for either vision, chaos spreads throughout the areas Israel has conquered in Gaza so far. For example, Israel has had effective control in northern Gaza since early January. However, that area of Gaza is in the most dire state relatively to the rest of the Strip. The UN World Food Program recently declared a "full-blown famine" in northern Gaza. Israel failed to establish any alternative ruling mechanism through smaller local groups, as was pushed by Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant. Instead, the international community needed to mitigate the humanitarian catastrophe, such as by the water port the Biden administration is building on the Gaza shore.   

That is to say, even if the Rafah invasion would be successful, it would not bring Israel any closer to a "total victory." Some justify invading Rafah for minor tactical gains, such as dismantling the remaining Hamas battalions, even though some reports suggest they have spread to other regions in the Gaza Strip in anticipation of the Israeli military operation. But in the larger scheme of things, even dismantling all of the Hamas battalions cannot force the Israeli government to make a more forward-looking decision about their plan for Gaza. It would just feed an eternal loop of displacing Palestinians from one area to another to allow for further military operations against local militant groups of Hamas or other terror organizations. In other words, more destruction and chaos. 

One prominent beneficiary of this doom loop is Netanyahu. For him, the war’s continuation enabled him to prolong his term as prime minister. Furthermore, after suffering a tremendous setback in the polls following the Oct. 7 attack, he managed to slowly increase his political strength. Although he is still trailing Benny Gantz, it seems it would be increasingly complex for Gantz to establish a government. In a few consecutive polls, Gantz’s potential coalition would have to rely on Raam, the Arab-Palestinian party, votes. Raam’s leader, Mansour Abbas, is a very moderate and pragmatic politician, famously agreeing to put aside national Palestinian aspirations to deal with material issues Arab-Palestinian citizens are facing, such as organized crime, lack of sufficient infrastructure, and discrimination in resource allocation. However, Raam’s participation in the Change Government, which briefly ousted Netanyahu in 2021-2022, exposed the coalition to ferocious attacks by Netanyahu and the Israeli right wing and led to its fall. Especially in times of war, where the coalition would likely need to face fundamental questions about Israel’s policy towards the Palestinians and continue some military operations in Gaza, a similar right-wing campaign might be even more effective and would strengthen Netanyahu. Moreover, the reality in Gaza would also make Raam’s collaboration with a Zionist government even more difficult to justify to the Arab-Palestinian public in Israel. 

Until elections would be held and the Israeli leadership would change, expanding the Israeli military operation to Rafah would not bring a different outcome from the Israeli offensive so far. The Netanyahu government lacks the political capability to reach any political solution. Hence, the foreseeable consequences of an operation in Rafah are exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, spreading chaos and anarchy, and helping Netanyahu in his campaign for political revival.

Eyal Lurie-Pardes is a visiting fellow in the Program on Palestine and Palestinian-Israeli Affairs at the Middle East Institute after being awarded with the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School LLM Post-Graduate Fellowship. Prior to joining MEI, Eyal worked with the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, the Zulat Institute for Equality and Human Rights, and as a parliamentary adviser in the Knesset. Follow him on X @eyallurie