"If it Hadn't Been for the Prompt Work of the Medics": FSB Officer Inadvertently Confesses Murder Plot to Navalny - bellingcat
Published at bellingcat.com
- Bellingcat and its partners reported that Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) was implicated in the near-fatal nerve-agent poisoning of Alexey Navalny on 20 August 2020. The report identified eight clandestine operatives with medical and chemical/biological warfare expertise working under the guise of the FSB’s Criminalistics Institute who had tailed Alexey Navalny on more than 30 occasions since 2017. At least three of these operatives were in the close vicinity of Navalny near the time of his poisoning.
- During his year-end press conference on Thursday of last week, Russian president Vladimir Putin did not deny Bellingcat’s findings, which detailed how these FSB operatives had been tailing Navalny, including on his trip to Tomsk. However, the Russian president claimed – without presenting evidence – that this was due to alleged cooperation between Navalny and “United States intelligence agencies”. Putin also denied that the FSB had any role in his poisoning, and stated that “if [the FSB] wanted to, they would have taken their job to the end”. He did not explain why a suspect would need to be surveilled by officers with chemical-warfare and medical backgrounds, nor why these agents communicated with leading Russian experts in nerve toxins in the days and hours before Navalny’s poisoning, as disclosed by Bellingcat.
Bellingcat can now disclose that it and its investigative partners are in possession of a recorded conversation in which a member of the suspected FSB poison squad describes how his unit carried out, and attempted to clean up evidence of, the poisoning of Alexey Navalny. The inadvertent confession was made during a phone call with a person who the officer believed was a high-ranking security official. In fact, the FSB officer did not recognize the voice of the person to whom he was reporting details of the failed mission: Alexey Navalny himself.
This 49-minute call between Navalny and Konstantin Kudryavtsev, one of the FSB officers who traveled to Omsk in the aftermath of the Navalny poisoning, provides a detailed first-person account that describes how the FSB organized the attempted assassination in Tomsk as well as the subsequent clean-up operation. The unintended confession adds significant new details to our understanding of the operation, including the exact manner in which, according to the FSB officer, the Novichok was administered. It also sheds light on Russia’s secret service’s efforts to destroy the evidence in the wake of what Kudryavtsev divulges was its failure to kill the opposition activist. Shockingly, the member of the suspected poison squad blames the fast response time of the pilot and emergency medical services for the failure of FSB’s assassination plot.
While Bellingcat representatives witnessed the phone call in real time several hours before the publication of our investigation, its content was so explosive that we decided, before disclosing the existence and contents of the call, to validate key details described by the FSB officer against objective data. We have since been able to confirm key allegations confirming the overall plausibility of the confession.
Navalny’s call to Kudryavtsev under the guise of a fictitious high-ranking aide also raised ethical questions about this method of obtaining data. However, following an internal debate we concluded that this action clearly falls within the realm of the overriding public interest in light of the extraordinary circumstances. Navalny was not working on behalf of any police or security service, nor was he conducting a traditional journalistic investigation — rather, he was in the unique position of investigating his own assassination attempt at a time when no law enforcement agency is willing to do so. To our knowledge, it is without precedent that a target of a political assassination is able to chat for nearly an hour with one of the men on the team that tried to kill him and later cover up the evidence. Our supplemental research into the revelations of this call — detailed further in this article — shows that the information provided by Kudryavtsev is credible, and has led to new investigative leads we had not previously discovered.
At the end of this report we will present the original, unedited audio and transcript of the 49-minute call, recorded by a Bellingcat representative.
Alexey Navalny during his phone call to Konstantin Kudryavtsev
The Early Morning Call
The phone call took place on the morning of 14 December 2020; several hours before Bellingcat and its partners would publish their investigation into the Navalny poisoning. Legal and journalistic standards obliged the co-publishing partners to confront the main subjects of the investigation and offer them the right of reply.
Prior to offering these rights-of-reply, Alexey Navalny requested the opportunity to confront, by telephone, members of the FSB squad implicated in his poisoning. Bellingcat agreed and arranged for its representatives to be present during the calls, for the purpose of obtaining any additional information that might be exchanged.
The calls were made beginning at 4:30 am CET (6:30 am Moscow time) from a location in Germany, where Navalny has been recuperating since his poisoning. In order to increase the chance of his calls being answered by the FSB operatives, Navalny used an IP telephony application which permits the custom-setting of a caller ID. In this case, the number that was selected for ID spoofing was that of an FSB landline which, call records showed, had been in regular communication with several of the squad members.
In the initial calls, which were made to the key members of the FSB squad and chemical weapons scientists who had been in contact with them during the operation, Navalny introduced himself and asked why the respective person had agreed to be involved in a plot to kill him. The called parties did not reply and hung up, with the exception of one of the contacted chemical-weapons scientists: Oleg Demidov — who said he had Covid-19 and couldn’t talk.
In addition to calling most of the FSB operatives on his own behalf (and failing to get a response), Navalny decided to call two members of the FSB squad, Mikhail Shvets and Konstantin Kudryavtsev, by impersonating a senior security official. To both of these officers, Navalny introduced himself as a fictional character: Maxim Ustinov, an “aide to [Chairman of Russia’s Security Council] Nikolai Patrushev”. The premise of the call was that Navalny — playing the role of “Maxim Ustinov” — would ask the officers for an oral report on the reasons for the failure of the Navalny poisoning operation.
The first call — to Mikhail Shvets, a member of the squad who had tailed Navalny during his July 2020 trip to Kaliningrad — was unsuccessful. Shvets listened to Navalny’s introduction as “Maxim Ustinov” and replied “I know exactly who you are”, before hanging up.
The second and last call was to Konstantin Kudryavtsev — a member of the FSB team who had graduated from the Military Biological-Chemical Academy and then worked in the 42nd (biological warfare defense) Institute of the Ministry of Defense, before joining the FSB. As we reported, Kudryavtsev traveled to Omsk twice in the aftermath of the poisoning: once on 25 August and a second time on 2 October 2020. His phone records had also shown that just before and during the suspected time-range of the poisoning, he had been in regular communication with Col. Stanislav Makshakov, the direct commander of the FSB squad and deputy director of FSB’s Criminalistics Institute.
This call was successful. Kudryavtsev initially thought he was receiving a call from Artyom Troyanov (his first line upon answering the phone was “Artyom, greetings…”), an FSB officer who — in Kudryavtsev’s own words — uses that landline number. “Maxim”, the non-existent aide to Nikolay Patrushev, told him that his call was routed via the FSB phone exchange, which might explain why it appears as someone else’s number, and Kudryavtsev appeared to believe this.
“Maxim” told Kudryavtsev that his boss had requested an urgent report from all members of the FSB team involved with the Navalny operation due the enormous problems this operation has led to. (Kudryavtsev implied that he understood what these problems were, saying “I also watch TV and read the Internet”). Kudryavtsev was initially hesitant to talk on an open line, and said he was not informed about all aspects of the operation due to compartmentalizing of information on a need-to-know basis. From his own subsequent account, it appears he was primarily involved with the evidence clean-up following the poisoning attempt and not the poisoning itself. However, “Maxim” was able to convince Kudryavtsev that his presumed boss needs every team member’s personal assessment of the operation, and furthermore, that the call had been authorized by Gen. Vladimir Bogdanov, director of FSB’s Special Technology Department. The latter piece of information appeared to persuade Kudryavtsev, and he agreed to answer detailed questions from Alexey Navalny, acting as the fictitious “Maxim”. This phone call was made before any publication on the FSB squad and their link to the Navalny poisoning operation, and without any of the operatives being publicly named. Thus Kudryavtsev’s decision to open up and share top-secret details seemed to be swayed by the detailed, non-public knowledge “Maxim” appeared to have about the composition of the FSB team that was involved in the operation.
The call lasted for 49 minutes. Navalny did not break character until the end.
Key Confessed Facts
The main, overarching admission made during the lengthy conversation was that FSB was indeed behind the poisoning operation against Alexey Navalny in Tomsk. While Kudryavtsev says he was not part of the actual poisoning operation in Tomsk, he admits to being involved in at least one previous operation in 2017, as well as in the clean-up operation after Navalny’s hospitalization in Omsk. He does, however, name his colleagues who were part of the Tomsk mission, and describes details that could only be known to a participant of the FSB’s entire operation. Kudryavtsev analyses, in uncannily mundane language, the reasons for the failure of the assassination operation. He also describes from a first-person perspective and in great detail the FSB’s cover-up measures undertaken to cleanse Navalny’s clothes and personal items of any trace of the toxin. Kudryavtsev also identifies two additional names, both FSB colleagues, who were involved in the clean-up operation.
Other inadvertently shared information validated our understanding of the modus operandi of the FSB poison squad, and in some cases added new details that help us understand its tradecraft.
Some of the details revealed by Konstantin Kudryavtsev were:
- Makshakov is the squad’s commander, and Alexey Alexandrov and Ivan Osipov were the main perpetrators of the poisoning in Tomsk.
At the start of the call, “Maxim” asks Kudryavtsev to evaluate the performance of his colleagues during the operation in Tomsk. Kudryavtsev expresses concern that he has signed a non-disclosure covenant, and suggests “Maxim” instead address his questions to Stanislav Makshakov. This is an unprompted naming of Makshakov by Kudryavtsev, and is the second time in the call he mentions Makshakov in the context of his chain of command. Subsequent references to Makshakov also place him in the context of commander and supervisor of this specific operation.
Later, “Maxim” mistakenly lists “[Oleg] Tayakin” in addition to “Alexandrov” as the two main operatives in Tomsk (Tayakin, as we reported earlier, was in fact the coordinator of the operation from Moscow). Kudryavtsev immediately corrects “Maxim” that Tayakin was not in Tomsk, but that Osipov was. This correction is an unprompted name addition by Kudryavtsev and the first time Osipov’s name appeared in the conversation.
“Maxim Ustinov” (M): You went to Omsk on the 25th. There was an operation in Tomsk, and now I’m making a short version of a report about what happened there. Vladimir Mikhailovich [Bogdanov, Lt. General and commander of the Criminalistics Institute’s parent FSB structure] will ask you to write a longer version later. I understand that this is a bad moment, but the leadership of the Security Council is asking me to prepare the documents now. So you will help me a lot, if you do not detain Nikolai Platonych [Patrushev, head of Russia’s Security Council].
Konstantin Kudryavtsev (K): I have signed a covenant not to… [disclose top-secret information]. If you talk to Makshakov.
M: I’ll talk to him. Konstantin, you just hear me out, please. You’ll submit written documents to Bogdanov later, of course. Right now I just need, I’m calling everyone, including your colleagues. I just need one paragraph of text in your own words. What, in your opinion, is the main problem of the failure of the operation in Tomsk? I’m writing it down.
K: Well, I don’t have all the information right now.
M: Of course you don’t. Well you to the extent that you have the information. Let me help you. Let you just… On a 10-point scale, how do you rate Alexandrov’s work? It’s clear that he’s your colleague, but nevertheless.
K: A-Alexandrov?
M: Yes.
K: Well, his work is good, yes. I rate it well.
M: How do you rate Tayakin’s leadership qualities? The coordination of the team?
K: Tayakin wasn’t there. Osipov was there.
Validation: this description conforms with the telephone and travel data that we used to substantiate our initial report.
NB: from the further discussion, it appears that Kudryavtsev is not familiar with the name of Vladimir Panyaev, a third FSB officer who traveled alongside Alexandrov and Osipov. This can possibly be explained by the fact that Panyaev is not a permanent member of the poison squad, but a supporting FSB operative. Panyaev accompanied Alexey Navalny on three prior trips before the Novosibirsk-Tomsk operation: in Novokuznetsk in December 2017, in St. Petersburg in 2019 and in Kaliningrad in July 2020. Kudryavtsev states explicitly that he does not keep records of names of other FSB operatives beyond the completion of each operation.
- FSB attempted to assassinate, and not simply incapacitate or intimidate, Navalny. Furthermore, the assassination project appears to have been a long-running one, and not a one-off attempt.
Kudryavtsev explains in the call that two unexpected circumstances intervened in the operation and prevented the expected outcome – which, it becomes clear from the context, was Navalny’s death. He also refers to “not just once”.
M: Okay. The obvious question, the answer to which should be in my paper. If you rate both Osipov’s and Alexandrov’s work well, why the failure? What needs to be done in the future to make sure none of this happens?
K: Huh. You know, there are always a lot of questions and nuances in our work, and we always try to take everything into account as much as possible so there are no miscalculations, and so on, you understand, right?
M: I understand.
K: That’s my opinion. At least, especially if you take into account what has been done before. But there are always nuances, there are always nuances in every job. The whole situation turned out, as it were, on one side... well, I don’t know how to say it properly here…
M: Well?
K: I also thought that it could have .. Well, they landed [the plane], and the situation developed in a way that… Not in our favor, I think. If it had been a little longer, I think the situation could have gone differently.
M: A little longer what, Konstantin Borisovich?
K: Flying.
M: Flying a little longer?
K: Well, maybe, yes, if it had flown a little longer and they hadn’t landed it abruptly somehow and so on, maybe it all would have gone differently. That is, if it hadn’t been for the prompt work of the medics, the paramedics on the landing strip, and so on.
M: The plane landed after 40 minutes, in principle this should have been taken into account in the planning of the operation. You can’t say that the plane landed instantly. You calculated the wrong dose, or [wrong] probabilities, why?
K: Well, that I can’t say why, how to say this. My understanding is that we added a bit extra, so…
[…]
M: …Let’s summarize it again. This person survived because the plane landed too soon – is that the main reason?
K: It seems to me that yes. If it had taken a little longer, maybe it would have ended differently. See, that’s where coincidence is the worst factor we can have in our work.
M: I see. By coincidence we mean circumstance number 1 – that the plane landed. Circumstance number 2 is what?
K: The fact that the ambulance arrived, and so on. They performed these primary measures, which they usually … they lowered the acidity level, injected an antidote of some kind. [ …] They acted directly according to their instructions, the medics did, so because of the fact that the ambulance was dispatched – that is also a factor. And then the fact that they took him to the hospital, and they also did something on the basis of the symptoms and all that.
[…]
M: I don’t understand, and based on the questions I’ve been asked, my bosses also don’t understand: was the plan to let him die in the hotel or on the plane?
K: I don’t have any information about that.
[…]
M: So everyone’s opinion of what’s right, what’s wrong, is very important, generally your view of the whole picture. Because the consequences of all of this, you know, will haunt us for a long time to come.
K: I understand, I also watch TV and read the Internet. They didn’t count on all of this, I’m sure it all went wrong.
M: It wasn’t counted on, to put it bluntly, so you have to understand.
K: Well I think it was supposed to happen shortly thereafter, maybe even… Or maybe it was calculated that he would fly, because you know, yes: it takes three hours or so to fly, it’s a long flight. If we didn’t land the plane, maybe there would have been a different effect, and the result would have been different. So I think that the plane played a decisive role. Well, one of the factors is that they landed and carried out the primary measures.
M: How much time elapsed from the time of the poisoning to the time he passed out?
K: I don’t have that information. I don’t know in terms of time when everything was done, that is, when it was administered. Makshakov will tell you that for sure, or the guys, maybe, those who know.
[…]
M: How many operations did we run on Navalny in total?
K: I do not remember how many, I remember that I was in Kirov, but I do not remember more.
Validation:
Kudryavtsev’s statements are consistent with the opinions of many leading specialists in chemical weapons, including two former OPCW experts consulted by us, who have opined that it would be impossible to properly dose and administer a less-than-lethal amount of a chlorinese inhibitor nerve agent of the Novichok type.
Kudryavtsev’s reference to a prior operation targeting Navalny in the Russian town of Kirov is corroborated by travel data reviewed by us: the first ever tailing operation by this FSB team took place in January 2017. Three weeks after Navalny announced his presidential bid, he traveled to Kirov – twice during January – for court hearings linked to the criminal charges against him. During both trips, Kudryavtsev traveled to Kirov: the first time arriving by train on 16 January 2017 (Navalny arrived by plane the next day); and the second time on 23 January (Navalny had arrived to Kirov the previous day). From Kudryavtsev’s words we cannot determine conclusively whether by “prior operation” he meant a prior attempt to poison Navalny, or just a prior preparatory operation.
- The FSB made concerted efforts to cleanse Navalny’s body, clothes and personal effects of any residue of the toxin.
Kudryavtsev says he was instructed to travel to Omsk twice in order to process Navalny’s clothes and eliminate any traces of the poison. (Navalny’s clothes remained at the Omsk hospital following his medical evacuation by plane to Berlin; he has still not received them back from Russian authorities). His first trip, Kudryavtsev confirms in the call, was on 25 August 2020. The second one, he says, was “some time later, a week or two weeks [later]”. He says that before his first trip, Navalny’s body had been treated in the hospital to remove any traces of the toxin. The same had been done with all his clothes.
Kudryavtsev says he believes that the German Bundeswehr lab was able to discover the use Novichok due to advanced techniques. He believes it is not possible that traces were left on Navalny’s body, but that the German investigators may have found metabolised traces in his blood.
M: […] Are the clothes processed and are they okay?
K: Well, at least the last time they were taken away, they were clean.
M: There won’t be any surprises with the clothes?
K: Well, that’s why we went several times.
M: So, the first time we went on August 25, and the second time?
K: Later, in a week or two, I guess, or a week later.
M: You don’t remember exactly?
K: No, unfortunately, I don’t remember. Makshakov will tell you.
M: Okay. Who else went with you?
K: With me?
M: Yes.
K: Vasily Kalashnikov.
[…]
M: I still have questions. Where are the things? What about the things?
K: What about the things?
M: Well, where are Navalny’s things?
K: Well, the last time I saw them was in Omsk. We left them there. We were working there.
M: You flew to Omsk on the 25th?
K: Well, I’d like to remember. Well, I guess, approximately, yes. I have it written down at work.
M: Specifically, what happened to them?
K: Their final destination?
M: Yes.
K: Well, I have no idea of the final location but I can tell you this. They were given to us when we arrived, they were brought to us by the local guys from Omsk… from this police, what’s their… transport police. They gave us the box, we worked with the box, respectively, and returned everything to the local guys. And the local boss – I have his phone number, I can give it to him if you need it – I told him to give the box back. Most likely, he gave it back to these guys, the transport police.
M: Yeah. And give me the chief’s number, please.
K: 89620592XXXX. [number redacted]
M: And the name/patronymic?
K: Mikhail Palych. He’s the chief…
M: Yeah, I’ll find out, no problem. Let’s get deeper into this. Was there anything on them? The box, that is, was something found on it, what exactly was done with it?
K: Well, we went twice. The first time it was an ordinary package, with seals all over it, it was torn all over. Well, there were things, they were all kind of wet. There were things, respectively, there was a suit, shorts, socks, masks, a T-shirt.
M: And what procedure did you implement, what did you do with that, so that I can report?
K: Well, the processing was done.
M: The processing according to this Biysk methodology? [Navalny was referring to a 2018 procedure for cleansing traces of chemical weapons developed by the Biysk Institite]
K: Biysk?
M: Well, correct me if I’m wrong.
K: No, no, I don’t know the Biysk methodology. Or maybe I do, but I don’t know what it’s about right now.
M: What exactly was being done, can you explain?
K: They treated it with solutions, that it wasn’t… ohhhh… how to say it… treated it so there wouldn’t be any marks there, nothing like that.
M: All the things were treated?
K: No, not all of them at first. First there were the basic ones: suits, underpants, all that stuff. While we were going, another box was brought in, everything-everything had already been processed there the last time.
M: On the things, is there any chance that Navalny’s wife, or someone at the hospital, cut off a piece of clothing and it got…
K: No.
M: There is no such possibility?
K: No. Everything was in one piece. There were no traces of cutting and so on.
M: In your opinion, how did the Germans eventually discover it all?
K: Well, they got the Bundeswehr involved. They have military chemists working there. Maybe they have some methods of detection.
M: In what place on his body could there be traces that they found?
K: They didn’t find any on the body, they didn’t find any on the body anywhere. They were probably testing using blood. There’s nothing on the body, I believe. The assumption is this. He was also washed directly in our hospital.
M: Who in the Omsk hospital can I ask if the body was washed?
K: No, that information is not available anywhere. But Mikhail, the BT chief, he has all the information about what was done.
M: Okay. I’m sorry, this is a naive question, but from what I’ve written down, I’m going to ask it. The clothes were washed because there might have been marks on the clothes. So there could have been marks on the body. But you’re saying there couldn’t have been marks on the body. Why is that?
K: Well, I think it just absorbs quickly. Doesn’t leave, I think, traces. Makshakov will tell you more about it, I don’t have all the information. I don’t even know what was done there. Well, I mean, you know, right?
M: I understand.
Validation:
Kudryavtsev indeed traveled twice from Moscow to Omsk, although the second time was much later than the two weeks he is remembering (it was in early October, nearly 6 weeks later). During his trip to Omsk on the 25 August 2020, his telephone records show that he spoke with the two persons he mentions in the call: Vasily Kalashnikov and Mikhail Evdokimov. (While he does not remember Evdokimov’s last name during the call, we were able to confirm it using telephone ownership data via a number of reverse-phone-search services).
We have previously identified Vasily Kalashnikov as an expert in gas chromatography–mass spectrometry; the best-practice method for discovery of metabolites of nerve agents in biological samples. Scientific papers authored by him are attributed to the FSB’s Criminalistics Institute. Makshakov’s phone records show that he called Kalashnikov in the morning of 20 August, shortly after Navalny collapsed into a coma and his plane landed in Omsk, and again on 21 August, minutes before the sudden reversal of the decision of Omsk doctors that Navalny’s state does not allow his transportation to Berlin.
Mikhail Evdokimov, first mentioned by Kudryavtsev and identified via the phone number given by him, is referred to by Kudryavtsev as “the local chief of BT”. This abbreviation is likely a short-hand for UBT, or FSB’s counter-terrorism Department (“Upravlenie po bor’be s terrorizmom”). The FSB’s UBT is a unit within FSB’s 2nd Service which also incorporates the “defense of the constitutional order and fight against political extremism”. Phone records from other members of the FSB poison squad, including Alexandrov and Osipov, show that during their trips outside of Moscow, they often call local contacts who are listed in various reverse-look-up apps as belonging to the UBT unit.
In a follow-up call to Mikhail Evdokimov attempted by Navalny (transcript found at the bottom of this article), he acknowledged that he had received the clothes from Kudryavtsev but refused to speak further on an unsecure line.
Based on a facial feature comparison, we believe that Mikhail Evdokimov may be the person seen in a photograph taken by Yulia Navalny in the office of the chief doctor of the Omsk hospital. The man sitting in the middle of the photograph with his mask down is the head of the Omsk Oblast Regional Ministry of Interior, Vyacheslav Kryuchkov.
Source: Kira Yarmysh
Left: man in photograph at Omsk Hospital. Right: Mikhail Evdokimov. Sources: Kira Yarmysh / VKontakte
- The Novichok toxin was applied to the crotch area of Navalny’s underwear
While Kudryavtsev makes it clear that he was not part of the operation that administered the poison, he positively answers “Maxim’’s question where the highest concentration of residue of the toxin might be expected to be found on Navalny’s clothes. Kudryatvsev promptly answers that this must be the inside of Navalny’s underpants, and in particular the seams in the crotch area. On a follow-up question by “Maxim” if those would be “the grey boxers”, Kudryavtsev specifies that as far as he remembers they were blue. In fact, the “grey underpants” was a decoy question, as Alexey Navalny told us he was hospitalized in blue undepants, and that these were part of the clothes that were left behind at the Omsk hospital.
Kudryavtsev also volunteers his supposition that there cannot be any traces left on the body due to the fact that, as far as he knows, the substance gets absorbed into the body very fast.
Given these admissions, it becomes most likely that the nerve agent was indeed administered to Navalny’s underwear, probably in the form of a spray or an ointment. This could have taken place at any time when Navalny was not in his hotel room for extended periods of time; or alternatively during the hotel laundry service (Navalny could not remember if the blue pair of boxer shorts that he wore on the day of the poisoning were part of the laundered clothes he had received on 18 August).
Notably, Kudryavtsev also volunteers the information that as part of the squad’s tradecraft, they always ensure that security cameras are switched off. This operational security measure would have allowed operatives to enter his hotel room – for instance, during his two-hour late night swim on the 19 August – without leaving a trace.
M: And on which piece of cloth was your focus on? Which garment had the highest risk factor?
K: The underpants.
M: The underpants.
K: A risk factor in what sense?
M: Where the concentration could be highest?
K: Well, the underpants.
M: Do you mean from the inner side or from the outer? I have an entire questionnaire about this, which I am about to discuss with Makshakov, but will require your knowledge as well.
K: Well, we were processing the inner side. This is what we were doing.
M: Well, imagine some underpants in front of you, which part did you process?
K: The inner, where the groin is.
M: The groin?
K: Well, the crotch, as they call it. There is some sort of seams there, by the seams.
M: Wait, this is important. Who gave you the order to process the codpiece of the underpants?
K: We figured this on our own. They told us to work on the inner side of the underpants.
M: Who said that? Makshakov?
K: Y-yes.
M: I am writing it down. The inner side. Ok… the grey-colored underwear, do you remember?
K: Blue. But I am not sure, better ask him about it.
M: And they are whole, I mean theoretically we could give them back? We are not going to do this, but they are undamaged and everything is ok with them?
K: Yes, all is clear.
M: Visually, nothing would be discovered? There are no spots, nothing?
K: No, no. Everything is fine, they are in good condition, clean.
M: The trousers?
K: There was a possibility that something remained there – on the inner side. So we cleaned them, as well. But this is hypothetical, since there was contact with the trousers, so some of it may be there. We processed the trousers. They are also clean and everything is fine with them.
M: Do you think this was a mistake — the method of administration?
K: Well, this is not my call.
M: What is your opinion?
K: This is what my superiors have decided, therefore, it is probably correct. The method is a good one.
M: Well, he remains alive, therefore, it is not that good. Do you understand what I am saying?
K: Well, I already said that the circumstances developed in a way for the situation to be as it is. There was contact – therefore the penetration was good enough. Those decisions depend on the situation and the experience.
[…]
M: Alright. Excuse the naive question, but given what I have written I have no doubt they are going to ask me: If the clothes were washed to remove any traces, how come you are absolutely sure there were no traces on the body. Why is that?
K: Well, because it is absorbed quickly. It does not leave any traces. Makshakov will tell you more about it, I don’t have all the information. I don’t even know what was done there. Well, I mean, you know, right?
M: I understand.
Impact of Call on Understanding of the Poison Operation
While during the call Kudryavtsev makes it clear that he was privy to only part of the operational details – in particular, the evidence clean-up in Omsk – he sheds important insight from an insider’s perspective on this and prior operations of the FSB squad. On one hand, his admissions corroborate our prior understanding of the chain of command inside the Criminalistics Institute and make explicit Col. Makshakov’s supervising role over the poison squad. The names of the key operatives involved with the Tomsk operation were also largely confirmed by Kudryavtsev.
The operative’s inadvertent confessions also corroborated our understanding of this squad’s operational tradecraft, including the fact that they purposely took different flights than their victim – including often splitting the squad into “brigades” that took different flights; and that security cameras were routinely switched off at the locations where they operated. The strict compartmentalization of information among team members – reducing the information dispersion on a need-to-know-basis – was a new insight for us.
The information provided by Kudryavtsev about the close relationship of this squad with local counter-terrorism FSB officers at the location of their operation is enlightening. It also conforms with data from telephone records of other squad members who routinely contact local UBT (counter-terrorism) FSB officers upon arrival to their destination. The FSB’s UBT unit, part of the FSB’s 2nd Service (Directorate), is closely linked to the FSB’s unit that is closest to the concept of political police; the Department for Defense of the Constitutional Order and Fight with Political Extremism.
Notably, the call also sheds light on the likely mode of administration of the Novichok onto Navalny’s underwear. This important operational detail will be crucial to future investigations of both this criminal incident and other poisonings that may have been perpetrated by this FSB unit in the past.
Full, unedited calls (English and Russian)
English Transcript of Navalny – Kudryavtsev Call
Konstantin Kudryavtsev (K): Yes, Artyom? Hello.
“Maxim Ustinov” (M): Konstantin?
K: Hello?
M: Konstantin Borisovich?
K: Yes, yes!
M: This is Ustinov Maxim Sergeevich, aide to Nikolay Platonovich Patrushev. I received your number from Vladimir Mikhailovich Bogdanov. I apologise for the early hour, but I urgently require 10 minutes of your time.
K: Alright.
M: The Heads of Defence and Security will discuss this once again, and they will probably ask you to prepare a full statement, but now I am doing a report for Nikolay Platonovich, which will be discussed by the Security Council at most senior level. I need … a single paragraph from every unit member: What went wrong? Why the Navalny operation in Tomsk was a complete failure? Tell me your view, I will write it down and then you can elaborate further in your own report.
K: But… was it a failure in Omsk?
M: No, in Tomsk, I am speaking of Tomsk!
K: Of Tomsk?
M: Yes.
K: What happened in Tomsk?
M: Konstantin Borisovich!
K: Yes, yes, yes.
M: Did you hear what I said. I am calling on Patrushev’s orders!
K: *coughing* No, I understand very well, I am just trying to remember what happened in Tomsk?
M: Well, what was the reason for you to go to Omsk on the 25th?
K: In Omsk or in Tomsk?
M: You went to Omsk on the 25th. The operation was in Tomsk and now I am making a brief report on what happened. Later, Vladimir Mikhailovich will ask you for an extended testimony. I know that you have already done so, but the heads of the Security Council have asked me to prepare a report now. Thus, you will help me immensely, and more importantly you will not make Nikolay Platonovich wait.
K: I will gladly help, but – you see – I have coronavirus and I am staying at home.
M: That is why I am calling you.
K: Did you call Makshakov?
M: Of course, I will call Makshakov. But now… this is a simple procedure: I will phone Alexandrov, Makshakov, Tayakin, and will ask each and everyone of them to explain themselves in a couple of paragraphs. This must be a two page report, and I don’t need to tell you who is going to read it. Let’s just say that I was not going to call you in 7 AM, if this was not urgent.
And I have a section here in the report, which states: “Kudryavtsev: … he thinks that because of this and this the operation failed, he thinks this should be done for it to succeed.”
K: I would have written that, but I am staying in home, quarantined.
M: So, you are going to tell me, and I am going to write it down.
K: I have already written something… If you talk to Makshakov…
M: I will talk to him as well, Konstantin. Just listen to me, please. Of course, you will make a written testimony for Bogdanov later. Now I need you, as I will ask everyone else, to tell me in a paragraph or so, what was the biggest problem in the Tomsk operation. I am writing it down.
K: But I don’t have all the information right now.
M: Of course. But to the extent that you have it…
Hello, I am writing…
Let me help you. On a scale from 1 to 10 how do you assess Alexandrov’s work? I understand that he is your colleague, but nevertheless…
K: А-alexandrov?
M: Yes.
K: Well, he is working well. I assess him positively.
M: Tayakin’s leadership qualities? How do you assess them? The Unit’s coordination?
K: Tayakin was not there. Osipov was there.
M: I know that Tayakin was not there, but Osipov. However, Tayakin was part of the operation, right?
K: I don’t know. I don’t have this info and cannot comment.
M: Alright. From 1 to 10 how do you assess Osipov? Wait, so I can write it down.
K: Yes, yes, yes. I assess him positively.
M: Therefore — one might reasonably ask, I am sure you would agree, and I must explain to Patrushev – if both Alexandrov and Osipov were doing their job well, how come the operation failed?
K: Well, I have been wondering myself about that, not once or twice. Given the situation, as far as I know it, and I don’t know all of it – you understand I only know what I am doing and what they are telling me.
M: This is why we are making a report. So everyone can present his own perspective. Right now, I am interested only in your opinion.
K: Well, everything was done well… in the end of the day, the job was executed. Now, how it was executed, why things ended the way they did… Not once, I have been thinking about that.
M: And this is the problem, isn’t it, that not once things ended up like that…
K: Are you calling me from Artyom Troyanov’s phone? Because I saw his number on the display when you called?
M: Of course, I am calling from… via the system. Bogdanov asked me to do so, in order for you not to worry.
K: Oh!
M: Alright. But I must ask you again the question, because I must write something down: If Osipov and Alexandrov did their job well, why the operation failed? What must be done in the future, for this not to happen again?
K: Ugh – ohh. Well in our profession, you know this yourself, there are a lot of unknowns and nuances. We are trying to take everything into account, so there will be no mistakes. You understand me, right?
M: I understand you!
K: This was thoroughly examined, at least I think it was. After all, especially if you consider what was done previously. But there are always nuances. In every task there are nuances, and in every situation things would have been different if… how can I say this appropriately…
M: What?
K: Well, I also thought that we might… When they landed – you know what I am talking about – he took the flight, they made an emergency landing, the situation developed… not in our favour. This is what I think. If it was a bit longer, I think things would have turned the other way.
M: What should have been longer, Konstantin Borisovich?
K: The flight.
M: He should have been in the air for longer?
K: Well, yes, if he was in the air for longer, and they did not land in such an abrupt way, possibly, things would have not gone the way they did. Meaning, if the medics did not aid him, if there was no ambulance at the airport, and so on.
M: The flight landed in 40 minutes. Principally, this must have been taken into account when the operation was planed. I would not describe this as an immediate landing. Perhaps, the dosage was not correctly estimated?
K: Well, I can’t say that. As far as I know, we added a bit extra, therefore…
M: Alright. Let me be honest with you, because you understand me as well. My bosses are telling me, and you know how bosses act, “Quickly! Go! Write this again, for a 15th time.”
K: Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes!
M: And I have this question here: What is the problem? There was Kaliningrad, then there was Tomsk. Why the problems in Kaliningrad were not addressed, in order for the operation in Tomsk to go smoothly?
K: Well, I don’t know anything about Kaliningrad, I don’t have this information. I know what happened, not in Kaliningrad, but in Tomsk. I don’t know about Kaliningrad, I don’t have this information.
M: Let us then turn to the specific technique: how was the substance administered? Do you think an appropriate method was selected?
K: Oh, yes, yes. I think, yes.
M: How can I briefly present this in the report?
K: Well, this should be communicated via a secure channel.
M: Do you understand who will read this report? On this level there is no place for operative channels. On this level, people are not concerned with details – I must explain them briefly how things transpired, and I want to do it correctly.
K: How what transpired?
M: How the substance was administered?
K: Well, I better say this through a secure channel. You understand, I was working after…
M: Yes, I know.
K: This was the sort of… At least what I saw was only the consequences of what they have done. Well, yes, the fact is that the location was perhaps… how can I say it… the place they put it, there might have been some possibility for detection, subsequently.
M: Well look, again, we’re having a frank conversation. You understand why I’m writing this: a bottle, a scandal, television, all discovered. For this reason, my bosses are telling me: explain to us why it was discovered, why it was on the bottle, and I must explain it briefly.
K: There was nothing on the bottle.
M: Okay. Then how the story with the bottle came about, if there wasn’t anything, or was it made up or something?
K: No, from what I know there was nothing on the bottle. I think Stanislav Valentinovich… I’m not 100% sure…
M: That’s why Bogdanov told me and gave me your phone number, because the task that I am given is to collect everyone’s views. However, this is not really a question of drawing some kind of organisational conclusions. The question is how to act in the future so that the leadership – on most senior level – can clearly understand what happened. So once again, I apologise for waking you up in the morning, but they are banging on my desk and saying: give me a two-page report, so that HE understands everything. What should I write in those two pages?
K: You called me first? You didn’t call anyone else?
M: I am starting with you, but I have a list, and I’m going to call everyone on it. I don’t really need you to tell me everything, I just need your perspective. What would you have done differently? If you were planning an operation, would you approach this in a different manner?
K: Well, but for this I will have to sit down and think it through. Depending on the situation, on the circumstances. Looking through different possible ways, or rather, not ways, but possible places. There are a lot of nuances and every nuance must be taken into account. In my opinion, everything was planned correctly, it could not have been any other way. If it hadn’t been planned correctly, nothing would have been done. This is my point. I am saying: the fact is that the method was chosen correctly, but there are always nuances.
M: So again, what method was chosen?
K: You don’t know?
M: Well, I know some things, and I don’t know others, but I have to ask you such-and-such questions, so I am asking them.
K: Well, I can’t tell you that over this phone.
M: That’s why I’m calling you, because I need [to fill out] this paper urgently.
K: You have to call Stanislav Valentinich on a secure line, he will probably tell you how it all happened, but I can’t tell you over this phone how it all happened.
M: You saw me calling you through the switchboard, you can tell me. This conversation has been agreed with Bogdanov.
K: No one called me, neither Bogdanov yesterday, nor Makshakov.
M: That’s because all of this started this morning, they woke me up at 5 AM and told me: do it, so I have been running around all morning frantically, looking for all the phones. If you so wish – I will call you in a while on an operational line, but you will save me a lot of time if you tell me now. Because I still have a list of 13 people to go through.
K: Would you tell me your name? I’ll write it down.
M: Ustinov Maxim Sergeevich, aide to Nikolai Platonovich Patrushev.
K: Mhm.
M: I still have some questions. What happened with his belongings?
K: What about them?
M: Well, where are Navalny’s things?
K: Well, the last time I saw them they were in Omsk. We left them there, after we went and worked on them.
M: You flew to Omsk on the 25th?
K: Well, I am trying to remember. I guess, that must be the case, yes. I have in on written record at work.
M: Exactly what happened with them?
K: Their final destination?
M: Yes.
K: Well, we received them when we arrived, they were given to us by the local guys from that Omsk’s police, how was it called… transport police. They gave us the stuff, we worked on them and subsequently returned everything to the local guys. And the local boss – I have his phone number, I can give it to you if you want it – I told him to return those stuff. Most likely, he gave them back to the lads from the transport police.
M: Mhm. Can you give me the chief’s number, please.
K: 8962059**** [redacted]
M: And his name?
K: Mikhail Palych [Platonovich]. He’s the chief of…
M: Okay, I will sort it on my own, no problem. Let us return to the belongings. Was there anything on them? Did you find something on the package, what exactly happened to it?
K: Well, we went twice. The first time we received them in an ordinary package, with seals all over it, that we removed. Inside were his things, they were all somewhat wet. There was his suit, underwear, socks, masks, a shirt.
M: And what procedure did you employ? How can I report what were you doing with those things?
K: Well, the processing was done.
M: The processing according to this Biysk methodology?
K: Biysk?
M: Well, correct me if I’m wrong.
K: No, no, I don’t know the Biysk methodology, or perhaps I know it, but am not making the connection right now.
M: What exactly did you do, can you elaborate?
K: We processed them with solutions, so… ohhhh, how can I say this… so there would be no traces left.
M: Did you process all of his belongings?
K: No, in the beginning only the main ones: the suit, the underwear, those things. Later, on our subsequent trip, they gave us a second package, and this time we processed everything.
M: Is there any chance, that Navalny’s wife or someone else cut off a piece of clothing and took it away?
K: No.
M: There is no such possibility?
K: No. Everything was in one piece. There were no traces of cutting or ripping apart.
M: Then, in your opinion, how did the Germans eventually uncover all of it?
K: Well, they got the Bundeswehr involved. They have military chemists working there. Maybe they have some methods of detection.
M: On which part of the body they could have found traces?
K: Nothing on the body could have been found, there was nothing there. They probably found something in the blood. I don’t think there was anything on the body. That must be the assumption. He was also washed in our hospital.
M: Who in the Omsk hospital can I ask if the body was washed?
K: No, this information is not available anywhere. But Mikhail, the BT chief, knows all about what was done.
M: Alright. Excuse the naive question, but given what I have written I have no doubt they are going to ask me: If the clothes were washed to remove any traces, how come you are absolutely sure there were no traces on the body. Why is that?
K: Well, because it is absorbed quickly. It does not leave any traces. Makshakov will tell you more about it, I don’t have all the information. I don’t even know what was done there. Well, I mean, you know, right?
M: I understand.
K: I don’t know, I don’t have this information. I was told, I went, I did it, and I left. All the other information, in terms of who went there and who did it – I am not aware of that.
M: I will talk to all of them myself, right now I am interested in your perspective. Let us review everything once more. This subject survived because the plane landed too soon — is that the main reason?
K: It seems to me so. If they were in the air for a bit longer, maybe things would have ended the other way. See, unforeseen events are the worst factor in our profession.
M: I see. By unforeseen events we mean circumstance number 1 – that the plane landed abruptly. And what is circumstance number 2?
K: The fact that the ambulance arrived, and so on. They performed these initial steps, the ordinary ones … lowered the acidity, injected an antidote of some sort. Supposedly, it is possible that such procedures can, you know, the symptoms are similar. They acted right away, the medics, because an ambulance was called – this is also a factor. And then the fact that they took him to the hospital, and there they also did something in relation to the symptoms and all that.
M: I don’t understand, and based on the questions I was given, my bosses also wonder: was the plan to let him die in the hotel or on the plane?
K: I don’t have any information about that.
M: But the planning was based on where it was supposed to happen.
K: If I knew, I would say, I don’t want to lie. I am not and was not aware of how it was supposed to go. I can only speculate.
M: So, speculate.
K: Well I can’t. It is not like I knew the entire plan. I was given the information I need to know, nothing more. They don’t give me anything else. Assuming, presuming – that’s bad, I think.
M: Assuming, presuming, is bad, but the task before me – excuse me for repeating myself like a parrot – is to talk to everyone, and let them express their own opinion. In our work, you are absolutely right to say – everything depends on unforeseen events, and other circumstances. For this reason, everyone’s opinion of what went right, what went wrong, is very important. We ask for your view in general, to give us the big picture. Because the consequences of all of this, you know, will haunt us for a long time to come.
K: I understand, I am also watching TV and reading on the internet. They didn’t think events will go the way they did, I am certain, it all went the wrong way.
M: Yes, to put it bluntly, it did, so we need to understand why?
K: Well, I think it should have happened sooner than it did. But perhaps they wanted it to happen on the plane, because you understand this: if he flew for three hours, if there was no emergency landing, then the result would have been different. In this sense, I think the plane played a crucial role. Well, it was one of the factors, the other being the ambulance.
M: How much time elapsed between the administering of the poison and the moment he passed out?
K: I don’t have this information. I don’t know exactly when the poisoning happened. Makshakov can tell you, perhaps, or someone from the lads could know.
M: I have a somewhat peculiar question. You traveled with Navalny several times, 2017 in Kirov, what is your assessment of him as a person?
K: What? How do I assess him in what sense?
M: Well, this is why I said it is a peculiar question.
K: He is meticulous, always cautious, on one hand. On the other, he travels a lot. Periodically they are changing their numbers, very careful in this regard. Perhaps, he had a hunch that he was followed, you understand me, hello?
M: Mhm, yes, yes, yes, yes, I am listening, and writing down.
K: Many times he said in his blog that he was followed. Therefore, he was very cautious, meticulous in this regard. Never did any unnecessary moves.
M: Is there any possibility that he saw someone from the unit in the face?
K: Oh, no, we always have strictly approached this, changing our clothes, and other stuff.
M: I have some information, that once members of the unit traveled in the same transport as him. Do you know anything about that?
K: I don’t know about that, unfortunately. Usually, we are always traveling with a different transport on purpose. And if he is traveling to several places, we have different teams traveling with different transports. We are always very careful,… I don’t know how this could have happened.
M: So you don’t know of such incident?
K: No, I don’t.
M: So, on a scale from 1 to 10 what it the possibility that his team caught you, took pictures of you, video recordings, or something of the sort?
K: Ohhhhhh, given the technology advancements… now cameras are everywhere. But even so, when there are cameras we are turning them off, you understand, right? We execute an operation only when the recon team tells us that we are good to go – I mean they describe us the setting and then we decide whether to do it or not. Therefore, we are always removing any possibility to be captured. Maximum conspiracy – this is of utmost importance. No one must be seen.
M: How do you assess the work of your teammates?
K: Who were on those missions? Well, those I have worked with, I assess positively!
M: Give me their names and phone numbers.
K: Whose?
M: Your contacts, with whom I can talk about this. I don’t think I will be dealing with this, but if my boss tells me to do it, I want to have their contacts so I can do my job.
K: Well, I don’t remember all the guys… There was Mikhail, and I can’t remember the rest. This was a long time ago, in 2017, I don’t even have their numbers anymore. I know him, because we kept in touch, we were on a mission a second time. But all the guys were good, everything was planned and executed well. I never had any complaints.
M: How many operations did you partake against Navalny?
K: I don’t remember how many, I was in Kirov and don’t remember any other.
M: I received information, that Navalny is preparing some sort of a publication. Perhaps, this is why they have asked me to contact you. And apparently he suspects that there were more attempts. What could he be talking about? What can he know? He could say: they tried to poison me several times. What could he could possibly say?
K: What he could be thinking of?
M: Yes.
K: Well, I don’t know. I am not following this so closely, I heard that he said he will reveal something, but I don’t know what is he talking about. Perhaps, something happened, but it did not reach me.
M: Your assistance has been quite useful. Let me go over my notes one more time. The flight – you answered that, the medics, yes, you assess your colleagues highly… Correct me if I am wrong about something. How do you assess Panyaev?
K: Who is that?
M: From the Unit, Vladimir Alexandrovich Panyaev.
K: Panyaev…
M: You don’t know him?
K: No, we have not met. Perhaps, the other lads know him.
M: Alright, I will discuss this with Stanislav Valentinovich. The clothes are processed, everything is fine with them?
K: Well, eventually, the last time that we were working on them – everything was clear.
M: We should not expect any surprises with the clothes.
K: Well, this is why we went there a couple of times.
M: So, the first was on the 25th of August, when was the second?
K: In a fortnight or in a week, perhaps.
M: You don’t remember, precisely?
K: No, unfortunately, I don’t remember. Makshakov will tell you.
M: Ok, who were you traveling with?
K: Who was traveling with me?
M: Yes.
K: Vasily Kalashnikov!
M: Kalashnikov…
K: Perhaps his name was not given to you?
M: I don’t have him in my list, strange…
K: Well, apparently the bosses though that…
M: Well, yes… Alright, I will discuss this with Bogdanov. Do you think there is anything left to be discussed over the phone?
K: I don’t think so. And I am not aware of exactly what they did over there. Do you understand me? I don’t know what happened in regards to the effect and