Blackout in Almaty. What actually happened in the Central Asian power system

Tengrinews.kz — The mass blackout on August 14 demonstrated the deep integration of Central Asian power grids and how a local failure can rapidly escalate into a regional crisis. A Tengrinews.kz correspondent consulted with experts to investigate what happened, whether the automated systems functioned correctly, and if a similar scenario could recur this winter.
What Happened on August 14
The first reports of power outages began arriving around 2:30 PM. Electricity was lost in several districts of Almaty and the Almaty Region. Reports later confirmed disruptions in the Zhetysu, Zhambyl, Turkestan, Kyzylorda, Karaganda, Abai, and Ulytau regions, as well as in Shymkent.
KEGOC later reported that at 2:37 PM on August 14, two hydroelectric generators shut down at the Toktogul HPP in Kyrgyzstan. According to the Kazakhstan system operator, this led to an overload of the North–East–South transit corridor and the separation of the Southern Zone from Kazakhstan's Unified Power System. Disruptions were also recorded in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.
In Almaty, the situation quickly escalated beyond a routine power outage. Traffic lights failed, mobile communication networks experienced disruptions, shops and establishments closed, and roads were paralyzed by traffic jams. At 3:11 PM, the metro came to a halt due to a total external power failure. Lighting and ventilation continued to operate on backup batteries while passengers were evacuated.
The consequences were also felt in Shymkent, where 38,760 residential and 4,790 commercial consumers were temporarily left without power.
In the Zhetysu region, three 500-kilovolt transmission lines suffered emergency shutdowns. Power was lost in Taldykorgan, Tekeli, and eight surrounding districts. The regional center also experienced internet and mobile service outages.
The blackout also impacted the railway network: KTZ reported brief delays for passenger trains. Service was subsequently restored.
Why a Failure in One Country Affected Its Neighbors
Energy expert and former head of KEGOC Asset Nauryzbayev explained that the power systems of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan are interconnected by high-voltage lines and operate synchronously. This system was established during the Soviet era.

"The most powerful energy flows between regions and countries are transmitted via 500-kilovolt lines. Generators in different states must operate in a single rhythm, maintaining a frequency of approximately 50 Hz. In normal conditions, this interconnection benefits all participants. If a small deficit occurs in one country, neighboring power systems automatically help compensate for it. Countries do not need to maintain massive individual reserves for rare emergencies," Nauryzbayev noted.

According to him, this same connection becomes a channel for spreading a major "disturbance": if a large plant or several power units suddenly shut down, demand does not disappear. Frequency begins to drop, power flows shift, and energy rushes toward the deficit point through available lines. This all happens in fractions of a second—well before dispatchers can even begin discussions.

"The larger the power system, the more reliable it is, as it has access to the reserves and generators of neighboring countries. Therefore, the connection with Central Asia is an advantage for Kazakhstan, not a problem—but only if the emergency automation is configured correctly," the expert stated.

Chairman of the Public Council under the Ministry of Energy and Managing Director of the Atameken National Chamber of Entrepreneurs Zhakyp Khairushev also believes that abandoning the unified power system would be a mistake. A larger synchronous system is typically more stable than an isolated one. However, mutual assistance must have technically calculated limits to ensure that supporting a neighboring country does not jeopardize domestic consumers.
What Triggered the Cascading Outage
According to Zhakyp Khairushev, two hydroelectric units with a total capacity of approximately 600 megawatts shut down at the Toktogul HPP in Kyrgyzstan. However, the expert warns that the scale of the entire emergency should not be viewed as limited to that figure alone.
As Khairushev explained, southern Kazakhstan remains energy-deficient and receives a significant portion of its electricity from northern power plants. When a deficit arose in the Central Asian unified system, the power flow through Kazakhstan surged. This additional load was superimposed on the existing transit flow via the North–East–South corridor.
Asset Nauryzbayev suggests that a sequence of line, generation, and consumer shutdowns likely followed. As the expert explained, when one line fails, its load is redistributed among the remaining ones. If those also become overloaded, the next line trips—creating a cascade.
According to Nauryzbayev, after the loss of 600 megawatts, the automated systems should have shed a comparable volume of consumption to restore balance. Engineers could then have ramped up power at other stations and brought consumers back online, he noted.

"The system must always remain in balance: generation must equal consumption. If the automation cuts off the necessary load, the accident is localized. But this time, it continued to escalate," the expert said.

Khairushev believes there is no universal critical threshold: the same 500–600 megawatts might go almost unnoticed in one network configuration yet become a severe disturbance in another.

"It all depends on how heavily the lines were already loaded, which units were under repair, where the reserves were located, and how quickly the stations could ramp up production. Furthermore, the initial loss of two units could have triggered subsequent shutdowns, making the final deficit significantly larger," he explained.

Why automation failed to stop the accident
According to Zhakyp Khairushev, disconnecting consumers does not always mean the protection system failed. In a severe accident, the intentional cutting of part of the load may be the only way to save the remaining power plants and lines.

"The primary task of emergency automation is not to provide electricity to every consumer at any cost, but to prevent the collapse of the power grid. Sometimes this requires shutting off individual cities or regions," Khairushev explained.

Asset Nauryzbayev believes the automation failed to stop the accident at an early stage. In his view, the initial deficit could have been localized with a smaller volume of shutdowns. The expert is particularly questioning the complete shutdown of the Almaty energy hub.

"In past accidents, Almaty continued to operate at least partially at the volume allowed by local generation. Why the Almaty stations completely shut down this time needs separate analysis," he stated.

As Khairushev noted, a final assessment requires studying the relay protection, automation, and the sequence of all shutdowns. The mere fact that regions were disconnected does not prove an automation error. Meanwhile, Nauryzbayev argues that the scale of the blackout raises questions about why the accident was not contained earlier.
Official statements from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan does not deny that the brief shutdown of two units at the Toktogul Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP) was the initial disturbance. However, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Energy considers it incorrect to label it the direct cause of the power outages in other countries.
According to the ministry, Kyrgyzstan quickly restored frequency in the unified power system and supplied about 250 megawatts of power to neighboring states. The ministry of the neighboring republic claims that the Almaty energy hub shut down only after the frequency had returned to normal levels.
Kyrgyz Energy Ministry issues statement on Almaty blackout
KEGOC linked the shutdown of the hydro-generators to the subsequent overload of the Kazakhstan transit and the separation of the Southern Zone. Thus, while the parties do not dispute the initial event, they differ in their assessment of its role in the further development of the accident.
Asset Nauryzbayev and Zhakyp Khairushev believe the answer lies in technical data rather than official statements. The investigation requires merging frequency and voltage logs, the direction and volume of flows, breaker statuses, oscillograms, and the sequence of protection triggers across all affected countries into a single timeline.
According to experts, such a sub-second synchronization will show what tripped first, how the deficit developed, and at what stage the Almaty energy hub went dark.

"The main issue is not finding someone to blame. Accidents will happen in the future. We need to understand how the automation responded to the initial failure and why it didn't stop it from escalating," Nauryzbayev said.

Factors affecting energy supply in the south
Nauryzbayev explained that during the winter period, the North–South transit can be loaded to approximately 2,200 megawatts. More can be transmitted briefly, but this cannot be sustained: in the event of a new power surge, the lines could become overloaded.
Khairushev identifies four structural problems in the Southern Zone:

a deficit in local generation;
limited throughput capacity of the North–South transit;
a lack of fast-acting regulating reserves;
the need to modernize control systems at existing power plants.

The expert says that the Toktogul HPP and the entire cascade on the Naryn River are particularly critical during evening peak consumption. According to him, hydroelectric plants can quickly ramp up production to help southern Kazakhstan navigate peak hours.
According to Nauryzbayev's assessment, the shutdown of the Toktogul units proved sensitive not only for Kyrgyzstan. It occurred within a system where southern Kazakhstan simultaneously depends on power transmission from the north and parallel operations with neighboring countries.
Impact of the blackout on Almaty
The blackout exposed the vulnerability of urban infrastructure. Traffic lights went out, the metro ground to a halt, and communication disruptions occurred. Visitors were stranded on the Shymbulak cable car. Police were forced to switch to high-alert mode, while traffic controllers had to man the intersections.
Asset Nauryzbayev believes that Almaty has long needed an independent uninterruptible power supply system for critical infrastructure: the metro, water supply, heating networks, communications, and traffic lights. Zhakyp Khairushev notes that the presence of a diesel generator or batteries does not yet mean a facility is truly capable of long-term autonomous operation.

"It is necessary to verify fuel reserves, automatic transfer switches, the technical condition of equipment, and the permissible autonomous runtime," he suggested.

Post-blackout priorities
Asset Nauryzbayev and Zhakyp Khairushev agree that Kazakhstan requires a comprehensive set of measures: from recalibrating automation systems to constructing new generation capacity and strengthening networks.
Nauryzbayev considers the primary task following the August 14 events to be an audit of emergency automation systems.

"First and foremost, we need to improve the performance of emergency automation so that accidents are compensated for at the earliest possible stage," he stated.

The second priority is developing internal generation in the south. According to Khairushev, the region does not just need additional megawatts, but flexible capacities capable of responding rapidly to frequency changes:

"The south needs additional internal generation—and not just megawatts, but flexible capacity capable of actually supporting frequency. We must complete the reinforcement of the 500 kV network and increase the transmission capacity of the North-South links."

Another essential measure cited by the expert is the creation of sufficient primary and secondary reserves. According to him, what matters is not the installed capacity of power plants on paper, but the volume of equipment capable of responding immediately at the moment of an accident:

"We must have real primary and secondary reserves. In a sudden deficit, the first seconds are of fundamental importance. Stations should not just output their installed capacity but must automatically react to frequency changes and participate in primary regulation."

Both experts also advocate for the use of energy storage systems. Such installations can almost instantaneously support the system in the first seconds and minutes following a loss of generation.
Another proposal from Nauryzbayev concerns the rules for the joint operation of Central Asian power systems. In his view, agreements between countries must provide for real accountability for failure to comply with agreed-upon operating modes.

"There must be strict, enforceable rules with penalties. Not just an agreement and that's it. If you fail to fulfill your obligations, you pay," the expert stated.

Winter outlook for the power system
The experts do not theoretically rule out a repeat of this scenario in winter. However, summer and winter modes cannot be compared directly. As Zhakyp Khairushev explained, more generating equipment should be operational in winter following the completion of summer maintenance campaigns. Therefore, the grid's readiness depends not only on the season but on the number of operating plants, available reserves, and the condition of lines at any given moment.
In his view, the August 14 accident should be used as a real-world stress test ahead of the heating season.

"Based on this event, I would re-calculate the most unfavorable scenarios for the Southern Zone, including a major loss of generation in Central Asia, the disconnection of individual 500 kV lines, and various winter peak levels," the expert said.

Asset Nauryzbayev, for his part, suggests evaluating whether the Zhambyl GRES can be used as an emergency reserve for the south. Electricity from this plant is expensive; however, during a large-scale accident, the ability to quickly restore the power system's balance is far more important.
At the same time, both experts believe that Kazakhstan should not disconnect from the Central Asian power systems. Interconnection with neighboring countries allows for the distribution of reserves, power exchange, and mutual support during deficits.

"Parallel operation is a major advantage. A larger synchronous system is typically more stable than a small isolated one. Giving this up would be a mistake. However, mutual assistance must have technically calculated limits," Khairushev emphasized.

Nauryzbayev holds a similar position: the joint use of reserves is more economically efficient than creating a separate, redundant reserve in each country:

"Accidents do not happen every day, and keeping all reserves in one place is inefficient. It is far more advantageous to share them between countries: today one country faces an accident, tomorrow another, and everyone helps each other. However, this advantage only works with proper management."

According to experts, rather than dismantling the unified regional power grid, the focus should be on strengthening our own.

"Kazakhstan needs sufficient generation in the south, a more robust North–South transit, genuine fast-acting reserves, modern automatic control systems, and updated emergency automation," Khairushev concluded.